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Abstract—Cooperative and non-cooperative Sense-and-
Avoid (SAA) capabilities are key enablers for Unmanned 
Aircraft Vehicle (UAV) to safely and routinely access all 
classes of airspace. In this paper state-of-the-art cooperative 
and non-cooperative SAA sensor/system technologies for 
small-to-medium size UAV are identified and the associated 
multi-sensor data fusion techniques are introduced. A 
reference SAA system architecture is presented based on 
Boolean Decision Logics (BDL) for selecting and sorting non-
cooperative and cooperative sensors/systems including both 
passive and active Forward Looking Sensors (FLS), Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B). After elaborating the SAA 
system processes, the key mathematical models associated with 
both non-cooperative and cooperative SAA functions are 
presented. The analytical models adopted to compute the 
overall uncertainty volume in the airspace surrounding an 
intruder are described. Based on these mathematical models, 
the SAA Unified Method (SUM) for cooperative and non-
cooperative SAA is presented. In this unified approach, 
navigation and tracking errors affecting the measurements are 
considered and translated to unified range and bearing 
uncertainty descriptors, which apply both to cooperative and 
non-cooperative scenarios. Simulation case studies are carried 
out to evaluate the performance of the proposed SAA 
approach on a representative host platform (AEROSONDE 
UAV) and various intruder platforms. Results corroborate the 
validity of the proposed approach and demonstrate the impact 
of SUM towards providing a cohesive logical framework for 
the development of an airworthy SAA capability, which 
provides a pathway for manned/unmanned aircraft coexistence 
in all classes of airspace. 
Keywords—Unamnned Aircraft Vehicle; Sense-and-Avoid; 
Unified Approach; Cooeprative; Non-Cooperative; Sensors. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The integration of Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (UAV) 
into all classes of airspace involves a series of challenges in 
order to ensure safe operations [1]. Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) are becoming to be used for a number of 
civilian and military applications, although the enabling 
technologies are considered to be far less developed in 
maturity level when compared to that of manned aircraft, 
raising concerns to the certification authorities, airspace 
users as well as general public [2]. One of the main 
challenges is the implementation of a unified approach to 
both non-cooperative and cooperative Sense-And-Avoid 
(SAA), which enables RPAS to perform equally or exceed 
the performance of the see-and-avoid ability of the pilot in 
manned aircraft [3]. A SAA system installed on a UAS 
should be capable of operating under various weather 
conditions and situations [4] and, as autonomy increases, 
with limited operator involvement. This entails information 
fusion from multiple sensors [2]. The SAA capability is 
defined as the automatic detection of possible conflicts by 
the UAV platform under consideration, resolving the 
collision risks and performing optimised avoidance 
manoeuvre tasks to prevent the identified collisions. In this 
context, the fundamental areas that need to be addressed for 
integrating UAVs in commercial airspace/aerodromes have 
been identified as part of the Aviation System Block 
Upgrades (ASBU) by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) [5]. Initial integration is envisaged by 
implementation of basic procedures and functions including 
that of SAA functions. Integration of UAVs in airspace 
traffic is foreseen by the implementation of refined 
procedures that would also cover lost links as well as 
enhanced SAA functions with higher degree of automation 
and meeting the required levels of integrity. Finally, UAV 
transport management will involve the implementation of 
UAV operations on the airport surface and in commercial 
airspace similar to conventionally piloted aircraft. In the 
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic 
Management (CNS/ATM) and avionics (CNS+A) context, 
the first recommendation addressing the operational and 
certification issues for civil UAS was issued by the Joint 
Aviation Authorities (JAA) CNS/ATM Steering Group [6, 
7]. Subsequently, the EUROCAE Working Group (WG-73) 
endeavours to address the following aspects:  
 UAV operations enabled by cooperative and non-
cooperative SAA solutions. 
 Command, control, communication, spectrum and 
security issues. 
 Initial and continued airworthiness. 
Current advances in state-of-the-art airborne sensors and 
multi-sensor data fusion methods have led to a number of 
innovative but at the same time dispersed non-cooperative 
and cooperative SAA solutions. Non-cooperative Collision 
Detection and Resolution (CD&R) for UAVs is considered 
as one of the key challenges that needs to be addressed. As a 
result, a number of non-cooperative sensors have been 
adopted as part of the research projects dealing with 
developing SAA functions. Multi-sensor platforms for 
obstacle detection by using millimetre-wave radar, electro-
optic/infrared, Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) and 
acoustic sensors are currently employed [8-10]. Ground-
based SAA systems using electronic sensors are adopted and 
they provide information for supporting decision tasks 
especially in Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) operations. 
Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) is used for detecting, 
tracking and avoiding obstacles in low-level flight [10]. The 
adoption of a multi-sensory approach to SAA (employing 
passive and active MMW radar, Forward Looking Infra-Red 
(FLIR), LIDAR and an Electronic Surveillance Module 
(ESM) for obstacle detection) has resulted in adequate 
performance in low- to medium-dynamics platform 
applications. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) equipped in a 
UAV platform is adopted for detecting motion and also in 
determining location, velocity, and size of ground obstacles 
[8]. Acoustic-based SAA system for small RPAS by 
adopting a multi sensor platform with acoustic sensors that 
allows detection of obstacles and intruders in a 360º Field of 
View (FOV) and by performing quick-reaction manoeuvres 
for avoidance has proved to be effective [11]. An approach 
to the definition of encounters models and their applications 
on the SAA strategies take into account both cooperative and 
non-cooperative scenarios. The states of the tracked 
obstacles are obtained by adopting Extended/Unscented 
Kalman Filter (EKF/UKF), particle filter or other multi-
senor data fusion techniques including learning based 
mechanisms is used in order to predict the trajectory in a 
given time horizon. On-board trajectory re-planning with 
dynamically updated constraints based on the intruder and 
the host dynamics is at present used to generate obstacle 
avoidance trajectories [12]. In the case of Cooperative 
scenarios, Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast 
(ADS-B) and Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) 
are adopted for implementing SAA [13]. Coarse-resolution 
radar based SAA solution has been implemented for small 
size UAVs [14] and its information is fused with data from 
ADS-B [15]. The avoidance trajectory is generated 
considered the use of on-board trajectory re-planning module 
with dynamically updated constraints based on the intruder 
and the host dynamics. The avoidance trajectories are also 
generated by considering the use of a nonlinear differential 
geometric guidance law based on collision cone approach 
and dynamic inversion, which, combined with a first order 
autopilot, allows for a satisfactory guidance of the UAV. As 
part of this research, the possible synergies attainable with 
the adoption of different detection, tracking and trajectory 
avoidance algorithms are studied. Additionally, a unified 
approach to cooperative and non-cooperative SAA is 
developed by determining the overall uncertainty volume in 
the airspace surrounding the intruder tracks.  
II. SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES 
The requirements for designing and developing an 
effective SAA system are derived from the current 
regulations applicable for the see-and-avoid capability of 
manned aircraft [16-18]. The proposed detection range and 
Field of Regard (FOR) have to be adequate to ensure 
separation from the intruder to prevent a probable near mid-
air collision.  In the case of see-and-avoid, the main roles and 
responsibilities of pilots and human factors are stated in FAA 
AC 90-48C and FAR 91.113 regulations as vigilance shall be 
maintained at all times, regardless of whether the operation is 
conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or Visual 
Flight Rules (VFR). Novel Human Machine Interface (HMI) 
engineering designs specifically targeting SAA capability are 
proposed as part of the US Air Force Common Airborne 
Sense and Avoid (C-ABSAA) program [19]. One of the 
fundamental limitations for certification authorities to fully 
certify SAA is to evaluate the ability of the current and 
future UAVs to be able to replicate the human see-and-avoid 
capability, at a comparable or superior level upon replacing 
the on-board pilot with a Ground Control Station (GCS) 
operator. The currently available SAA technologies do not 
meet the targeted levels of safety with the practical Size, 
Weight and Power (SWaP) criteria of a UAV platform for 
both Line-Of-Sight (LOS) and Beyond Line-Of-Sight 
(BLOS) operations. Similar to the substantial efforts carried 
out by large scale air traffic management programmes 
including NextGen in US and SESAR in Europe, the 
Australian airspace is undergoing changes under the OneSky 
project to incorporate UAV as one of its entities. The general 
requirements for implementing an effective SAA include: 
 The SAA system shall detect both cooperative and non-
cooperative collision threats during day and night and 
considering adverse weather conditions.  
 The SAA system shall notify the operator for any 
imminent collision risk and provide a collision 
resolution or execute an autonomous avoidance 
manoeuvre.  
 The SAA system shall consider any direction or warning 
from other avoidance systems.  
 The SAA system shall provide a recommended course 
resume action after any avoidance manoeuvre.  
The requirements for autonomous operations include: 
 The SAA system shall execute an autonomous 
avoidance manoeuvre if the pilot does not perform the 
suggested resolution from the SAA system.   
 The SAA system shall provide the operator the 
necessary information on the progress of the 
autonomous manoeuvre (time and weather permitting)  
 The SAA system shall execute a return-to-course action 
after an autonomous manoeuvre is executed.  
The requirements of separation and avoidance include: 
 The UAV SAA system shall warn the operator warnings 
of obstacles within an estimated distance of 3000 m. In 
the case of cooperative vehicles the minimum separation 
shall follow the standards stated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). 
 The generated avoidance manoeuvre shall be based in 
the standards established in FAA 91.113.  
 The generated avoidance manoeuvre shall prevent mid-
air collision and has to consider other avoidance 
manoeuvres generated by other systems such as TCAS. 
 If the pilot avoidance manoeuvre increases the risk of 
collision with any other obstacle the system shall 
override the pilot command. 
 If the pilot does not execute a return to course 
manoeuvre after an avoidance action either from the 
Flight Control System (FCS) or from the operator, then 
the UAV shall autonomously return to its original 
course. 
A number of cooperative systems and non-cooperative 
sensors can be employed in the SAA system design. The 
non-cooperative SAA sensors are employed to detect 
intruders or other obstacles in the UAV FOR when 
cooperative systems are unavailable in the intruders. Optical, 
thermal, Laser Obstacle Avoidance System (LOAM), 
Millimetre Wave (MMW) radar, SAR and acoustic sensors 
can be employed as part of non-cooperative SAA. Moreover, 
the cooperative systems including TCAS and ADS-B can be 
combined for with the sensor suite. The SAA technologies 
are listed in Table 1 representing C for cooperative systems 
and NC for non-cooperative sensors [20]. 
TABLE I.  SAA CANDIDATES 
Sensor/ 
System 
Type Information Trajectory 
Visual 
camera 
NC,  
Passive 
Azimuth, 
Elevation 
Extracted 
Thermal 
camera 
NC,  
Passive 
Azimuth, 
Elevation 
Extracted 
LOAM 
NC,  
Active 
Range Extracted 
MMW 
Radar 
NC,  
Active 
Range,    
Bearing 
Extracted 
SAR 
NC,  
Active 
Range,  
Bearing 
Extracted 
Acoustic 
NC,  
Active 
Azimuth, 
Elevation 
Extracted 
ADS-B C 
Position, Altitude 
and Velocity 
Provided 
TCAS/  
ACAS 
C 
Range,  
Altitude 
Extracted 
Based on the state-of-the-art technologies, a typical 
Boolean-logic based decision tree SAA system reference 
architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1. A typical example of 
prioritisation is selecting ADS-B data when both ADS-B 
system and TCAS are present on-board the UAV platform 
(represented by dashed lines in Fig. 1). Considering ADS-B 
measurements as A, TCAS data as B and the output for 
cooperative SAA function as O1, the expression for the 
Boolean logics implementation is derived as follows: 
O1 = A + (A ⊕ T)                            (1) 
O1 = A + (A T’+ T A’)                        (2) 
O1 = A (1 + T’) + T A’                       (3) 
O1 = A + T A’                                (4) 
Similarly, a Boolean logics decision tree is also 
employed for the non-cooperative case. Representing data 
from visual camera as V, thermal camera as I, LIDAR as L, 
MMW radar as M, SAR as S, acoustic as A and the output 
for non-cooperative SAA function as O2, the expression for 
the Boolean logics implementation is derived as follows: 
O2 = A · M · L · S · (V + (V ⊕ I))                  (5) 
O2 = A · M · L · S · (V + (V I’+ I V’))              (6) 
O2 = A · M · L · S · (V + I V’)                    (7) 
A combined decision tree is adopted for accommodating 
both non-cooperative sensors and cooperative system 
information.  This is described by the overall output O as:  
O = (O1 ⊕ O2) + O2                          (8) 
Additionally, naturally inspired sensors can be form part 
of the system architecture. Naturally occurring sensory 
mechanisms derived from behaviours of insects including 
spatial and temporal isolation, sound as defense, startle and 
interference, and combining acoustic defences as well as 
other mechanisms including cognition based sensing can be 
part of the sensor suite [21-24].  
Non-cooperative 
sensors
Cooperative 
systems
Visual 
Camera
Thermal 
Camera
Acoustic
LOAM
MMW 
RADAR
ADS-B
TCAS/
ACAS Obstacle/ Intruder Tracking 
Intruder Trajectory Determination 
Criticality Analysis – Prioritizing, 
Declaration and Action Determination
Avoidance Trajectory / Separation   
Commands Generation
Sensor Management – Multi-sensor     
Data Fusion
Mission Management System
Autopilot
Flight Controls
SAR
Naturally inspired sensors
 
Fig. 1. SAA technologies and system process. 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) can be 
adopted for implementing cooperative system and non-
cooperative sensor selecting and sorting through an array of 
dedicated programmable logic blocks. 
III. SAA SYSTEM 
The sequential steps involved in the SAA process for 
executing an efficient Track, Decide and Avoid (TDA) 
process are illustrated in Fig. 1. The trajectory information of 
the intruders is determined after performing multi-sensor 
data fusion techniques [25]. Criticality analysis is performed 
to prioritize (i.e. to determine if a collision risk threshold is 
exceeded for all tracked intruders) and to determine the 
commands to execute an avoidance action. If an evading 
situation arises, the SAA system generates and optimises an 
avoidance trajectory according to a priority based cost 
function based on minimum distance, fuel, time and closure 
rate criteria with the aid of differential geometry algorithms 
to generate a smooth and flyable trajectory [26]. In addition 
to avoiding ground based and airborne obstacles, current 
research is also addressing virtual obstacle detection and 
avoidance including Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) unintentional and intentional radiofrequency signal 
interference (i.e., jamming and spoofing), no-fly zones, 
noise-sensitive areas and wake turbulence regions.  
 
IV. UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
Uncertainty analysis is performed to determine the 
overall safety volume in the airspace surrounding the 
intruder track based on SAA Unified Method (SUM). This is 
accomplished by considering both navigation error of the 
host UAV platform and tracking error of the 
intruders/obstacles and translating them to unified range and 
bearing uncertainty descriptors. Let    ,     and     
represent standard deviations of the navigation error (   , 
   ,    ) or tracking error (   ,    ,    ) in the  ,   and   
directions respectively. Using a spherical coordinates frame 
of reference, with origin at the host UAV centre of mass, the 
range and bearing errors associated with the intruder tracking 
measurements are transformed into a local Cartesian 
coordinate frame (either host or intruder body frame). The 
transformation process results in the generation of navigation 
and tracking error ellipsoids defined as [3]:  
  
   
  
  
   
   
  
   
                               (9) 
( , θ, φ) are the spherical coordinates defined on a point P. 
The Cartesian coordinates of the surface points are given by: 
                                             (10) 
                                             (11) 
                                              (12) 
Navigation and tracking error ellipsoids are illustrated in 
Fig. 2. In order to develop a generalized solution towards 
obtaining a unified approach to cooperative and non-
cooperative SAA, the ellipsoids are subjected to two 
transforms: rotation, R and translation, T (projection along 
LOS).  
Host UAV
Navigation Error 
Ellipsoid
X
Y
Z
Rx
RY
RZ
Detected 
Obstacle / Intruder
Tracking Error 
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X
Y
Z
Rx
RY
RZ
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Azimuth, φ
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Fig. 2. Navigation and tracking error ellipsoids 
The inverse transformation applied to one ellipsoid with 
respect to another, L is expressed as: 
                                              (13) 
The condition taken into consideration is that the 
coordinates of the centre, P should satisfy: 
  
         
  
  
         
   
  
         
            (14) 
The simplification of the above equation results 
considering multivariate Gaussian statistics results in a 
quadratic condition that is used to derive the miss, tangential 
and intersection conditions based on the resultant 
discriminant. Vector analysis is applied to the navigation and 
tracking ellipsoids. Let  ⃗  denote the points on the surface of 
the ellipsoid. The components of  ⃗  are    = x,    = y and    
= z. Let the surface normal vector be denoted as  ̂  The 
normal vector can be expressed as : 
 ̂   
  ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗⃗⃗  
|  ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗⃗⃗  |
                                       (15) 
The differential surface area element,    which is an area 
of a patch of the surface at        is given by: 
                                              (16) 
   |  ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗       ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗|                                 (17) 
where S is a proportionality constant. The decomposition 
is expressed in terms of parameters A, B and C given by: 
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗      ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                        (18) 
     ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗      ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗                                     (19) 
     ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                                        (20) 
The parameters D, E and F are given by: 
      ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗     ̂                                    (21) 
   
 
 
    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗     ̂     ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ̂                       (22) 
      ⃗⃗⃗⃗  ⃗   ̂                                   (23) 
The derivatives of the decomposition of the above 
parameters are given by: 
       
  
                                          (24) 
        
   
                                        (25) 
and other derivatives. The parameters D, E and F involve 
vector products of the derivatives of the components of  ⃗  
and  ̂. S is expressed in spherical harmonic expression as: 
         
     
                              (26) 
The shape of the combined navigation and tracking 
uncertainty volume (accounting for both uncorrelated or 
correlated sensor measurements) is conveniently described 
using spherical harmonics. Let        represent the smooth 
function defined on the ellipsoid and the parameterization of 
this spherical harmonic representation is given by: 
       ∑ ∑     
 
    
 
                        (27) 
 The function        is limited to a number of N finite 
coefficients and   and   represent the direction index.     is 
a factor and the function          is the spherical harmonic 
function and is given by:  
         √
            
        
          
          (28) 
 
where     represents the Legendre functions. The Legendre 
polynomial function is given by: 
 
       
 
    
         
   
                          (29) 
 
Expanding      as                        , we 
have     and     defined as the spherical harmonic 
coefficients. The spherical harmonic coefficients are 
obtained as: 
                                             (30)                                        
                                                (31) 
                                            (32) 
and for all other l, m: 
 
     
 
  
(
 
 
) (
 
 
)        
             
     ×                    (33) 
∑
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   (
      
 )  (  
  
 )    
       
   
 
 
where     is the Kronecker symbol and (a, b, c) represents 
the semi-major radius of the navigation or tracking error 
ellipsoid.     are the zonal coefficients (functions of 
latitude) while             are the tesseral coefficients 
(functions of longitudes). When l=m, sectorial coefficients 
are obtained which are functions of both latitudes and 
longitudes. When the errors are correlated tensors analysis is 
adopted to properly account for covariant or contravariant 
components. Six components are associated with a rank-2 
symmetrical tensor    , which are three diagonal and three 
off-diagonal components usually occurring in pairs. The 
equation of an ellipsoid associated with the tensor is given 
by: 
                                           (34) 
where   is the radius vector having components    and   . 
Considering a three-dimensional space, the covariance tensor 
for the error ellipsoid is given as: 
   [
       
       
     
]                         (35) 
for components (i, j, k) along (X, Y, Z) axes. The partial 
derivatives of an invariant function provide the components 
of a covariant vector. A contravariant vector is the same as a 
contravariant tensor of first order. A notional example of the 
two combined navigation and tracking error ellipsoids and 
the resulting uncertainty volume for uncorrelated 
measurements is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Uncertainty volume. 
The unified approach provides a basis for modelling the 
avoidance volume surrounding the ground based and 
airborne obstacles irrespective of the sensors/systems 
employed on-board the airborne platform. The shape of the 
overall safety volume is described using harmonic analysis 
and as a special case, when the errors are correlated, 
covariant and contravariant tensor theory is applied. The 
approach grants the possibility of current and future 
platforms to be equipped with SAA capability based on a 
sensor-independent and platform-independent solution. The 
proposed techniques also address the fulfilment of Required 
Total System Performance (RTSP) for CNS+A framework. 
This research also addresses the challenges in meeting the 
stringent GNSS data integrity requirements essential for 
airworthiness requirements for both cooperative and non-
cooperative SAA. Based on a properly designed and 
certifiable Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) 
system, an extended spectrum of autonomous and safety-
critical operations will be possible, thanks to the 
continuously monitoring of GNSS integrity levels [27, 28]. 
This increased level of integrity could facilitate and expedite 
the pathway to support unrestricted access of RPAS to 
commercial airspace.  
V. SENSOR/SYSTEMS ALGORITHMS 
 
A. Non-Cooperative sensors 
Gimballed visual and thermal cameras are used for 
determining position and velocity estimates of the obstacles / 
intruders. In order to effectively use non-cooperative sensors 
for all-time and all-weather operations, thermal imaging is 
used in conjunction with the visual sensors. The proposed 
hardware for the camera provides an approximate FOV of 
70º with a resolution of 2.0 MP. The fusion of optical 
sensors with other non-cooperatives sensors increases the 
angular accuracy. LIDAR is proposed for extracting range 
measurements and provides a FOV of 40º in azimuth and 15º 
in elevation. It allows the operator to select the azimuth 
orientation of the FOV among three possible directions: 
aligned with the platform heading (normal flight envelope) 
or 20º left/right with respect the platform heading. This 
option provides an optimized coverage for turning 
manoeuvres at high angular speed. A low-cost navigation 
and guidance system is adopted for determining Position, 
Velocity and Attitude (PVA) estimates, which includes 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), Micro-
Electromechanical System (MEMS) Inertial Measurement 
Unit (IMU), Vision Based Navigation (VBN) sensors and 
Aircraft Dynamics Model (ADM) virtual sensor [21 - 25]. 
When the set threshold is exceeded and the detection is 
continuous, high level tracking detection is performed by 
using a Kalman Filter. The Track-To-Track (T
3
) algorithm is 
employed for sensor fusion. The primary advantage of 
adopting this method is to combine the estimates instead of 
combining the observations from different sensors. The track 
fusion algorithm is defined as the weighted average variance 
of all the tracks and is given by: 
 ̂   |       |   ∑   
    |    ̂ 
 
     |     (36) 
    |    ∑   
    |       
                    (37) 
There are two main advantages of the track-to-track 
algorithm against other scan fusion methods: 
 At each sensor site there is local independent track 
information available so a higher integrity is achieved. 
 The information needs to be transferred at lower rates 
for data fusion.  
Similar to Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), the track-to-
track algorithm assumes a common model of the state. In 
order to obtain good results for tracking, the system 
covariance   and the observation covariance   are 
considered constant and are assigned with the following 
values: 
  [
      
      
      
      
]                   (38) 
  [
  
  
]                                 (39) 
It can be observed that compared to a single tracker, the 
error statistics of the track-to-track algorithm give better 
results in mean and standard deviation. Once the states are 
estimated a future trajectory is predicted. The approach 
employed to do this task is based on an extension of the state 
and from the output equation:  
                                         (40) 
where            and the matrix   locates the states in the 
vector   that belong to the object position and hence we 
have:  
[
 
 
 
       |  
       |  
 
   (    | )]
 
 
 
   [
 ̂     |  
   ̂     |   
 
      ̂     |     
]   (41) 
where    is defined as a future horizon up to where it is 
desired to predict the trajectory.  ̂     |   are the 
estimates of the track-to-track algorithm, that contains 
information for all the local estimations, at the next sample 
time. The errors in predicted trajectory can be derived from 
the quality of the measurements, reflected in the prediction 
error, which are expressed as: 
       |               ̂     |       (42) 
where        is the exhibited (modelled) trajectory and 
 ̂     |   is the predicted optimal trajectory at sample time 
   . For trajectory prediction, the obstacle centre of mass, 
the target orientation and the geometric shape of the 
uncertainty volume are determined. Once the trajectory is 
predicted, the Risk of Collision (ROC) is determined by 
calculating the probability of a Near Mid-Air Collision 
(NMAC) event for the predicted trajectory over the time 
horizon by employing Monte Carlo approximations given 
by: 
 (    (   ))  
 
   
∑ (          |      |    )
   
       
(43) 
where     is the number of samples,    is defined as a 
future horizon up to where it is desired to predict the 
trajectory,    is the minimum distance required to avoid the 
obstacle,    is the time horizon defined for collision and the 
subscript    is added to distinguish it from the number of 
runs in a Monte Carlo simulation. The accuracy of the 
approximation is entirely based on the number of samples.  
B. Cooperative systems 
Currently the majority of air traffic surveillance around 
the world is achieved through Primary Surveillance Radar 
(PSR) as well as Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) has 
been viewed as a low cost alternative and complement to the 
current primary surveillance radar. According to the 
definition provided by International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), ADS-B refers to the function on a 
surface vehicle or airplane which broadcasts its state vector 
together with other relevant information periodically [28]. 
ADS-B system is used to obtain the state of the intruders. 
The future position of the intruders is projected based on the 
estimate of the current state vector and the flight profile. The 
ADS-B measurement model adopted for intruder position 
and velocity estimates in   and   cardinal directions is given 
as: 
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Assuming that the velocity components,      ,   ̇   , 
      and   ̇    are affected only by Gaussian noise with 
zero mean, the standard deviation is defined by the 
covariance matrix given by: 
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            (45)       
where      represents the mean. An Interacting Multiple 
Model (IMM) algorithm is adopted for data fusion. The 
IMM model is a state-of-the-art tracking algorithm suitable 
when multiple kinematic behaviours are to be considered. 
Using this model, the state vector of the intruders is 
determined and this is propagated to predict the future 
trajectories using a probabilistic model. After computing the 
mixing probability, the combination of the state estimate is 
given by: 
 ̂   |   ∑   ̂
   |                               (46) 
where       is the mode probability update. For conflict 
detection, the resultant covariance matrix,   after 
transformation is defined as: 
                                            (47) 
where S is the diagonal covariance matrix and R represents 
the transformation matrix between the heading aligned frame 
to that of the RPAS host platform frame. The probability of 
conflict is defined as the volume below the surface of the 
probability density function,        representing the conflict 
zone. The conflict probability,    is expressed as: 
    ∫ ∫       
  
  
       
       
                    (48) 
where        represents the conflict separation distance 
and         correspond to the rows of the conflict boundary 
matrix. The conflict probability is simplified as: 
               -                    (49) 
The surveillance data processing is illustrated in Fig. 4.  
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Fig. 4. Surveillance data processing. 
Conflict detection and resolution is the collection of the 
following components: 
 Trajectory prediction, which estimates the flight mode 
of the intruder based on the information derived from 
cooperative/non-cooperative sensors and predicts the 
future trajectory of the intruder. 
 Conflict detection, calculating the time to separation 
violation point and conflict probability within the look-
ahead time, based on relative range, velocity, and 
altitude difference.  
 Conflict resolution, which uses all available information 
to resolve the conflicts. 
 Monitoring the avoidance manoeuvre, which verifies 
that conflicts are being resolved as planned. 
Conflict detection is based on the geometrical 
relationship between the intruder and aircraft within the look 
ahead time based on the state vector information. The 
violation of minima separation requirement is identified. The 
information regarding the violation is then transferred to 
conflict resolution module of the Mission Management 
System (MMS). After the conflict is resolved, the aircraft 
nominal trajectory is restored. In terms of speed change 
resolution, the flight path is the same except for meeting the 
requirement of time management in the 4D trajectory 
management. After resolution, navigation computation 
module of MMS receives inputs from SAA block to 
compensate the time difference as illustrated in Fig. 5. 
Additionally, the speed change resolution introduces fewer 
conflicts during resolving manoeuvre in terms of stochastic 
analysis because it still flies along its allocated path. 
Therefore if the speed change resolution is available, it 
would be preferred compared with other resolutions.  
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Fig. 5. Interaction with MMS. 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS 
Simulation case studies were performed utilising an 
AEROSONDE UAV as the host platform. The minimum 
separation distance was set to    = 500 m.  The host RPAS 
was equipped with a SAA system employing cooperative 
and non-cooperative conflict resolution and collision 
avoidance. A representative scenario with two intruders was 
simulated, where intruder 1 (AEROSONDE UAV) was not 
equipped with cooperative SAA, intruder 2 was equipped 
with a cooperative SAA system capable of achieving conflict 
resolution and collision avoidance (large commercial 
airliner). The intruder states are derived using the host UAV 
non-cooperative Forward Looking Sensors (FLS) and also 
tracked with the aid of ADS-B messages (when available). 
The required separation distance is achieved with respect to 
all intruders after resolution is performed (both horizontally 
and vertically). As an example, the horizontal and vertical 
separation obtained with respect to the first intruder is shown 
in Fig. 4. The generated avoidance volume and the actual 
trajectories for this case are shown in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Intruder 1 horizontal and vertical separation.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Avoidance of descending intruder by host UAV. 
After the obstacles are detected and tracked, an 
avoidance trajectory is generated and the corresponding 
action commands are executed. Results of several simulation 
cases show that the required safe separation distance is 
always maintained when the SAA process is performed from 
ranges in excess of 500 m. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The analytical models describing both non-cooperative 
and cooperative sensors were discussed. Uncertainty analysis 
was performed to obtain the overall uncertainty volume 
associated with the intruder track using a novel unified 
approach. Various state-of-the-art technologies for DAA 
were identified and a reference system architecture based on 
Boolean Decision Logics (BLA) along with the sequential 
tasks required to implement an effective DAA functionality 
were presented. A detailed simulation case study was 
presented and it is concluded that the proposed DAA system 
is effective when cooperative/non-cooperative detection is 
performed from ranges in excess of 500 m demonstrating the 
feasibility of the proposed DAA solution. In future research, 
integration of the DAA system with other avionics and 
ground-based systems for Intent Based Operations [29] will 
be performed.  
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